Sometimes it could seem that Donald Trump has no coherent foreign policy whatsoever, and only acts as whims come and go in his mind. That might well be true. But what if he does? If we assume that President-elect Trump (and/or his team) does have a coherent foreign policy - a brave assumption - how does it look like?
It turns out there is a line that seemingly joins all the dots that have been revealed so far. The particulars are:
1. He wants to confront and contain China.
2. This necessitates a rapprochement with Russia, which both he and Putin appear to want anyway.
3. Such a strategy has the potential of directing Russia towards a new Great Game in Central Asia, where Chinese influence is on the ascendant as a consequence of Xi's "One Belt, One Road".
4. To save US resources and increase pressure on Beijing, Washington will allow Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei more freedom of action in return for rearmament.
5. In this new set of priorities, Europe is less important to the US - probably as important as Canada was during the cold war. After all, the European powers are too far away from East Asia, too pacifist, and too busy with sorting out their own continent's affairs to be of help to either America or China. As a consequence, the US would try to play down its NATO commitments leave the old continent alone.
6. As a corollary of (2), (3) and (5), the US would consider an informal recognition of a Russian sphere of influence - in other words, acquiescing to the status quo in Ukraine and the Caucasus, and allowing Putin a free hand in Syria - a good price in exchange for Russia being detached from China.
7. India, under a Hindu-nationalist BJP government, has already been drifting closer to Japan and America. It would not be inconceivable for the US to draw India into a common front: one that might be set up ‘against radical Islam’ in name, but coincidentally would also be against China.
8. Given Chinese claims in the South China Sea, it is unlikely for ASEAN to become solidly anti-America (or anti-anything, for that matter) any time soon.
9. Increased pressure on China from North and North-West (3), East (4), South-East (8) and South-West (7) could be complemented by a threat of a US-China trade war. It may or may not materialise, but the threat itself would bring uncertainty - and given capital has been flowing out of China and into the US since 8th November, the Trump administration may judge China to be more vulnerable to a showdown than the US is.
If this were the true outlines of a Trumpist foreign policy, it would be in the best Republican realpolitik traditions. It is easy to forget that throughout the 70s and 80s, it was Nixon and Reagan who had befriended China to put pressure on the Soviet Union. If Trump goes to Moscow, it would be no more surprising than Nixon in China, 1972.
Of course, even if Trump had a plan, it is not unlikely for events to overtake it - one does not need to look further than George W. Bush and 9/11 for an example. And while I’ve been assuming that that Trump (or his foreign affairs advisers) does have a coherent policy, I might well be wrong - it is quite probable that I was - and only time would tell which case it is.
Also on Facebook
