沒有被時代選中的我們

舊同學傳來中七最後一個上學日時拍的合照。我問，這麼多年前的照片，怎麼會平白無故找出來看。他說，沒有特別找啊，是臉書「當年今日」提醒他而已。噢，是今天嗎？到舊網誌一看，果然。2009年三月四日，星期三，陰。天文台資料顯示，當天京士柏錄得日照0.0小時，雨量0.4 毫米。是一個平常的春日。

我試着回想那天的事。記得和眾人去每個班房敲門找老師拍照(所謂「洗樓」)，在停車場高呼學校和某位老師的名號，又和不同的同學留影。散學彌撒中，有某新來的校長致詞。八年後還記得這個，是因為後來每當遇到比我晚畢業的師弟，談起舊校近況，他們不時會說，你在某校長主政前畢業，真好。然後我會半認真地亂答，哪裏是這樣，我走的時候他已經上任三天了啊。

但我知，他們才是對的。余生也早；他們經歷種種爭議其間，我只是個旁觀者：2009年的暑假後，校方一改多年來的自由放任，引入多種行政和紀律措施。學生評議會對校方通過遺憾動議。作為回應，該校長辦了一個校政座談會，並提出「天台論」。大意是「過度」的自由就像沒有欄杆的天台，很危險云云。後來得知，現在最後一個上學日有上天台合照的「傳統」，應該可以算是這位校長的功績。2011年，時任教育局長孫明揚推動縮班，校長打算響應，又卻因舊生反對而撤回。

但余生也晚。老師和師兄口中有如神話傳說的人事，我未能目睹，只能耳聞，或在某位教育學者的「田野考察」中讀到。聽說1999年教育署視學來訪，對當時的自由放任校風不盡同意，竟引來學生評議會的遺憾動議，學生會還寫了一封(在校內流傳)的公開信，向當局闡述教育理念，校方也未加阻攔。我入學前後的那幾年，正是學生電腦小組(Student Computer Team, SCT)的全盛時期：華仁3D街景、串流平台，後來都在Google Map、YouTube出現普及。SCT也管理電腦室。我中一二時其餘熱仍在：某年暑假後到電腦室，牆壁上滿滿貼着那年七一遊行的全黑海報。果真是舊世界打個落花流水，人人憧憬相信進步和發展的九十年代。後來不知怎的，跟很多事情一樣，SCT就寂靜無聲地凋落了，像春天的木棉花一樣。

這都只是華仁自家的事。2014年後罷課、佔領運動、本土思潮相繼出現，對本港中學也多少有所影響。於今回望才明白，在華仁度過看似平凡的七年，其實多麼罕有。那年官府和學聯對話，岑敖暉自稱「被時代選中嘅細路」時，有點百感交集地想，時代跳過了我們，而把這般重擔交付予你們，真好。這實在是我們的福份。

現在談論到前人後人時，我也許會說，換了我做未必做到。記得中六時校方突然開始在上課時間鎖上大門，學生會執委會討論是不是要做點甚麼，學生報編輯說，不如把下一期的封面改成黑白，並且搞一個關於自由傳統的專題吧。我也覺得不錯，卻有成員認為，「學生的主要責任就是讀書」，這樣也好像有點過火，等等。最後的折衷方案，是不搞專題，但那一期《華粹》封面以黑白印刷。有多少同學明白我們的苦心，就不得而知了。對於自己往日種種不足，現在都看得清楚了；每當回想，總會暗自慶幸，好在沒遇到更有趣，更具挑戰性的日子啊。

某同事家裏是工黨人。最近某天跟他吃午飯時，他說，工黨長期執政的年代裏，他常跟父母抱怨，那美好的仗，都被他那代人打贏了，當跑的路，都被他那代人跑過了；到刺激的時代降臨，又想念以往的平靜。我只好回答說，民主政治有時像鐘擺，會擺過去，就會擺回來的。

以前讀到胡蘭成在與張愛玲結婚的證書上題「願使歲月靜好，現世安穩」會想，為甚麼兩句都用上聲結尾呢，唸起來不太好聽啊。後來留意到，原來十個字裏面有九個是仄聲。但如果現在還是只有這般的疑問，你說多好。

(2017年三月四日，於往伊斯坦堡航程上)

臉書連結

六年前的一件小事

2011年夏，去過一次外交部駐港特派員公署的座談交流活動。有貌似高層手持演辭，以平靜的語調照本宣科。讀到「你們青年人朝氣蓬勃，好像早晨八九點鐘的太陽」時，好像忽然想到了甚麼，問在場者知不知道是哪位名人說的。鴉雀無聲六七秒之後，有人舉手，半認真地答道，是偉大的領袖毛主席。貌似高層略帶欣賞地說，對，是毛主席，然後放下演辭，面向觀眾朗聲道，「世界是你們的，也是我們的，但是歸根結底是你們的。你們青年人朝氣蓬勃，正在興旺時期，好像早晨八九點鐘的太陽。」然後他又拿起演辭，以原來的語調繼續宣讀。

現在的我想，如果二十一歲相當於忙於起床梳洗換衣服出門的早晨八九點鐘，那現在就也許是早上十一點。街上行人還稀落，社會的齒輪如常轉動，甚麼也不大發生的十一點。

演講之後是答問環節。問題不算多，而我只記得其中兩條。

在下問了一條。具體用字當然無從考究，但大意是：正如閣下剛才所講，貴公署根據基本法第十三條設立，處理職責屬外交部的外交事務，但與此同時，基本法第一百五十一條訂明本港可在「經濟、貿易、金融、航運、通訊、旅遊、文化、體育等領域單獨地同世界各國、各地區及有關國際組織保持和發展關係，簽訂和履行有關協議」，兩者是如何調和的。貌似高層好像把不多的笑容再收起一點——或者他只是要組織一下答案，我向來不擅於觀言察色，不敢妄作猜測——回答說，當然大家都要根據這本基本法來做事，公署負責的是外交事務，等等。

我續問說，或者我表達得不好，或者可以舉例說，(2011)年初香港和紐西蘭剛剛在世貿框架下簽署了自由貿易協議，不知道公署有沒有和港府合作呢。他說，據他所知，這個協議基本上是你們香港方面去談的，我們沒有太多的參與。

然後有與會者問，要報考香港的公務員職位，我們知道要怎樣做，但如果想為祖國效力，又應該怎樣報考加入中國外交部呢。貌似高層說，在一國兩制之下，兩地制度、文化都相當不同，現時也沒有這樣的機制，如此之類，並勸勉大家為香港的繁榮安定努力。

講座後我們去參觀圖片展。印象最深刻的是一幅地圖，詳細標出周恩來、陳毅某次出訪中東、非洲，還特地繞路到阿爾巴尼亞的來回路程，實在是時代的見證。在入口大廳的樓梯上拍過大合照，便告解散。

今夜在回家的地鐵上，無端又想起這小小的往事。

(LBWE-E02)

臉書連結

Import & Export of Children in post-war Britain

After I got my haircut this afternoon, I walked past China Exchange near Leicester Square. It was hosting an exhibition on the Connection between London and Hong Kong. Not a bad way to spend the rest of my Saturday afternoon, I thought. And my friend Timson Lau was helping out there, I was pleasantly surprised to find.

There I learnt the stories of the tens of abandoned children from Hong Kong who were adopted by families across the South East during the '50s and '60s. A recent study found many of them reported to have encountered racism in their lives or felt detached from both white and Chinese communities. But at the end, the report concluded in terms of "psychological adjustment and life satisfaction, there were no statistically significant differences between the ex-orphanage women and the comparison groups".

Which is fair, I thought. We all have an equal chance at misfortunes in life; they just come in different flavours.

And the stories of Britain's own child emigrants came up in my mind. It was in V&A Museum of Childhood that I read about them, more than a year ago. Charities, religious organisations and governments ran migration schemes that sent children from poor neighbourhoods - often born to single mothers - to Australia and Canada. Many were forced to leave school as early as 15 and work on farms as hard labourers. Some were abused. The last child left the shores of Britain as late as 1970.

What an interesting country I'm in. On one hand, thousands of British children were sent to the other side of the world to toil in farms; on the other, at the same time, well-meaning middle-class families in the Home Counties imported orphans from the Far East for adoption.

At the end, it worked out for some and didn't work out for some other, in proportions not statistically unlike people who stayed where they had always been. Statistically.

(LBWE-E01)

===========================

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Read also:

• Townsend, Mark. "How a generation of orphans fared when they were matched to mixed-race couples". The Guardian. 2 February 2013
• Davey, Melissa. "Abused and publicly flogged: the UK child migrants sent for a better life in Australia". The Guardian. 16 June 2016

生活在別處，可以是一種心理狀態

某次在倫敦的晚飯，同桌友人提及一位最近離英回港，生性特立獨行的共同朋友。姑且稱他A君吧。他說，回港搏殺的舊友當中，很多都漸漸變成同一種人，想法也變得可以預期。我笑說，或有一天，我們會懷念起A君的奇行怪論來。

事後回想，身為香港人而在倫敦工作，確是有魚與熊掌兼得的傾向。我們遊走於英港兩套文化之間，隨心地選擇混合：喜歡的話，可以穿聖誕毛衣戴聖誕帽出席聖誕晚飯；不喜歡的話，也可以連聖誕晚飯也不去。再進一步，如果想要效法美國人、伊朗人、荷蘭人、日本人、以至自己隨心所想的某些作法，不太越界的話，大概亦無有不可。當然，決意全面融入彼邦生活模式之中，或者在英格蘭重現在港的一切，大抵也是可能的選項。在英國長大而又在英國工作的英國人，就未必能有同樣的自由，得以兼得兩個世界的最好。

然而，有選擇的自由，就得為選擇負責。有些事情，別人或者會理所當然地覺得應該是這般，或者那般；文化慣例已經幫他們免去了思考的重擔。在長年生活在別處的異鄉人眼裏，卻會覺得無論選擇這般或是那般，都得向自己好好解釋。於是經常躊躇、猶疑。時而迷失，有時錯過。

這也許是享有自由的代價。

(2015年十二月二十三日草稿於倫敦，一直未曾分享，竟漸遺忘於電話的筆記簿內至今。日前有朋友問起，有沒有回港定居的打算，一輪標準答案之後，想起這篇文稿。自知思慮欠周片面，有請各方好友不吝指正。2017年一月二日於赫爾辛基機場。)

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窮而後工

昨天見到Muk Lam，跟她說我一直都有讀她在臉書上的近況，寫得真好。豈料她說，已經很久沒寫了呀。大概是近來雖然工作忙碌，但別無閒事掛心頭，寫作的動力也就少了。

說得也對。文字大抵可以被不安感壓出來。當未來彷彿被煙霞覆蓋，或對所寄情的物事患得患失，所掛心者又未可輕易解釋，便假借虛實人事代言。又或移心外物，時事政治、風土人情、花鳥蟲魚，不一而足。若是生活美滿，別無所求，活在當下還來不及，還哪來這麽多打字的閒情逸致。

穆醫生內有所蘊而得施於世，而心無憂思感憤之鬱積，自然無所外興於文辭。歐陽修謂詩窮而後工，應亦如是。

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If Trump has a foreign policy, how might it look like?

Sometimes it could seem that Donald Trump has no coherent foreign policy whatsoever, and only acts as whims come and go in his mind. That might well be true. But what if he does? If we assume that President-elect Trump (and/or his team) does have a coherent foreign policy - a brave assumption - how does it look like?

It turns out there is a line that seemingly joins all the dots that have been revealed so far. The particulars are:

1. He wants to confront and contain China.

2. This necessitates a rapprochement with Russia, which both he and Putin appear to want anyway.

3. Such a strategy has the potential of directing Russia towards a new Great Game in Central Asia, where Chinese influence is on the ascendant as a consequence of Xi's "One Belt, One Road".

4. To save US resources and increase pressure on Beijing, Washington will allow Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei more freedom of action in return for rearmament.

5. In this new set of priorities, Europe is less important to the US - probably as important as Canada was during the cold war. After all, the European powers are too far away from East Asia, too pacifist, and too busy with sorting out their own continent's affairs to be of help to either America or China. As a consequence, the US would try to play down its NATO commitments leave the old continent alone.

6. As a corollary of (2), (3) and (5), the US would consider an informal recognition of a Russian sphere of influence - in other words, acquiescing to the status quo in Ukraine and the Caucasus, and allowing Putin a free hand in Syria - a good price in exchange for Russia being detached from China.

7. India, under a Hindu-nationalist BJP government, has already been drifting closer to Japan and America. It would not be inconceivable for the US to draw India into a common front: one that might be set up ‘against radical Islam’ in name, but coincidentally would also be against China.

8. Given Chinese claims in the South China Sea, it is unlikely for ASEAN to become solidly anti-America (or anti-anything, for that matter) any time soon.

9. Increased pressure on China from North and North-West (3), East (4), South-East (8) and South-West (7) could be complemented by a threat of a US-China trade war. It may or may not materialise, but the threat itself would bring uncertainty - and given capital has been flowing out of China and into the US since 8th November, the Trump administration may judge China to be more vulnerable to a showdown than the US is.

If this were the true outlines of a Trumpist foreign policy, it would be in the best Republican realpolitik traditions. It is easy to forget that throughout the 70s and 80s, it was Nixon and Reagan who had befriended China to put pressure on the Soviet Union. If Trump goes to Moscow, it would be no more surprising than Nixon in China, 1972.

Of course, even if Trump had a plan, it is not unlikely for events to overtake it - one does not need to look further than George W. Bush and 9/11 for an example. And while I’ve been assuming that that Trump (or his foreign affairs advisers) does have a coherent policy, I might well be wrong - it is quite probable that I was - and only time would tell which case it is.

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Translation Exercise II / 翻譯練習(二)

Author: Isaac Cheung (in Chinese) 

Reasons why the left has failed and failed in recent years:

1. Long term alliance and compromise with the liberals. The left effectively gave up scrutinising neoliberalism and went over to the side of its beneficiaries. It unknowingly declared war on the traditional working class, and as a result conceded its own historical class foundation to the right.

2. The intellectuals' decoupling from the trade unions. On one hand, the movement became increasingly elitist: intellectuals of the left moved virtually all practice of their theories into the confines of universities. On the other hand, the trade unions lost their natural visionaries. They no longer claim to have a blueprint for class struggle. They became short-sighted and rarely saw beyond protecting their respective industries. This laid the ideological foundation for nationalist protectionism of the right to take over the working class.

3. Ideological confusion within the left itself. It spent too many years away from labour movements. It spent too many years being the junior partner of the liberal mainstream. It does not only lost its identity. It also lost its framework of thinking. For example, the left adopted the liberals' moralistic perspective to politics and forgot how to objectively analyse the interests of different social classes. Some leftists even chose to see the working class as 'amoral' and 'unenlightened' and preferred the alliance with a 'rational' and 'noble' middle class with little revolutionary potential.

If the left hopes to ever regain its political energy to challenge the right, it must first review how the liberals' way of thinking has infiltrated its own. And then, it must examine whether its alliance with liberals still makes sense: perhaps, it was not in spite of, but because of this alliance, the right has risen.

(by Isaac Cheung)

原文：

講講左派近年不斷失敗的原因：

1. 長期跟自由派妥協、結盟：這相當於放棄在批判新自由主義上的 commitment，站到新自由主義得益者的邊上，暗地裡向傳統工人階級開戰，結果就是將整塊傳統的左翼階級基礎讓給了右派。

2. 知識份子與工會的 decoupling：一方面是左派知識份子的實踐基礎幾乎全面轉移至大學，造成了左翼運動的菁英化；另一方面工會則失去了長遠的階級抗爭藍圖，視野日益狹小，向保護主義傾斜，實際效果就是在工人階級之間為右翼的民族主義保護主義打下意識形態基礎。

3. 左派自己的 ideological confusion：長期脫離工運、寄生於自由派主流的結果，就是左派在喪失自己的 identity 同時，也在喪失對事物分析的能力。例如學自由派以道德化視野去分析政治，而不是唯物地分析不同社會階級的利益基礙。這導致這些左派選擇繼續將工人階級視為「不道德」和「愚昧」的，並選擇了跟那些「理智」而「高尚」、卻沒有多少革命潛力的中產階級結盟。 

左派若要重新獲得能與右派抗衝的政治能量，恐怕最首要的一件事就是去重新檢視左派思想當中自由派思考風格的影響，而第二件事就係去反省「與自由派聯盟對抗右翼」呢個策略本身仲 make 唔 make sense，定其實正正由於呢種結盟右翼勢力先可以養到今日咁大。

連結