窮而後工

昨天見到Muk Lam，跟她說我一直都有讀她在臉書上的近況，寫得真好。豈料她說，已經很久沒寫了呀。大概是近來雖然工作忙碌，但別無閒事掛心頭，寫作的動力也就少了。

說得也對。文字大抵可以被不安感壓出來。當未來彷彿被煙霞覆蓋，或對所寄情的物事患得患失，所掛心者又未可輕易解釋，便假借虛實人事代言。又或移心外物，時事政治、風土人情、花鳥蟲魚，不一而足。若是生活美滿，別無所求，活在當下還來不及，還哪來這麽多打字的閒情逸致。

穆醫生內有所蘊而得施於世，而心無憂思感憤之鬱積，自然無所外興於文辭。歐陽修謂詩窮而後工，應亦如是。

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If Trump has a foreign policy, how might it look like?

Sometimes it could seem that Donald Trump has no coherent foreign policy whatsoever, and only acts as whims come and go in his mind. That might well be true. But what if he does? If we assume that President-elect Trump (and/or his team) does have a coherent foreign policy - a brave assumption - how does it look like?

It turns out there is a line that seemingly joins all the dots that have been revealed so far. The particulars are:

1. He wants to confront and contain China.

2. This necessitates a rapprochement with Russia, which both he and Putin appear to want anyway.

3. Such a strategy has the potential of directing Russia towards a new Great Game in Central Asia, where Chinese influence is on the ascendant as a consequence of Xi's "One Belt, One Road".

4. To save US resources and increase pressure on Beijing, Washington will allow Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei more freedom of action in return for rearmament.

5. In this new set of priorities, Europe is less important to the US - probably as important as Canada was during the cold war. After all, the European powers are too far away from East Asia, too pacifist, and too busy with sorting out their own continent's affairs to be of help to either America or China. As a consequence, the US would try to play down its NATO commitments leave the old continent alone.

6. As a corollary of (2), (3) and (5), the US would consider an informal recognition of a Russian sphere of influence - in other words, acquiescing to the status quo in Ukraine and the Caucasus, and allowing Putin a free hand in Syria - a good price in exchange for Russia being detached from China.

7. India, under a Hindu-nationalist BJP government, has already been drifting closer to Japan and America. It would not be inconceivable for the US to draw India into a common front: one that might be set up ‘against radical Islam’ in name, but coincidentally would also be against China.

8. Given Chinese claims in the South China Sea, it is unlikely for ASEAN to become solidly anti-America (or anti-anything, for that matter) any time soon.

9. Increased pressure on China from North and North-West (3), East (4), South-East (8) and South-West (7) could be complemented by a threat of a US-China trade war. It may or may not materialise, but the threat itself would bring uncertainty - and given capital has been flowing out of China and into the US since 8th November, the Trump administration may judge China to be more vulnerable to a showdown than the US is.

If this were the true outlines of a Trumpist foreign policy, it would be in the best Republican realpolitik traditions. It is easy to forget that throughout the 70s and 80s, it was Nixon and Reagan who had befriended China to put pressure on the Soviet Union. If Trump goes to Moscow, it would be no more surprising than Nixon in China, 1972.

Of course, even if Trump had a plan, it is not unlikely for events to overtake it - one does not need to look further than George W. Bush and 9/11 for an example. And while I’ve been assuming that that Trump (or his foreign affairs advisers) does have a coherent policy, I might well be wrong - it is quite probable that I was - and only time would tell which case it is.

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Translation Exercise II / 翻譯練習(二)

Author: Isaac Cheung (in Chinese) 

Reasons why the left has failed and failed in recent years:

1. Long term alliance and compromise with the liberals. The left effectively gave up scrutinising neoliberalism and went over to the side of its beneficiaries. It unknowingly declared war on the traditional working class, and as a result conceded its own historical class foundation to the right.

2. The intellectuals' decoupling from the trade unions. On one hand, the movement became increasingly elitist: intellectuals of the left moved virtually all practice of their theories into the confines of universities. On the other hand, the trade unions lost their natural visionaries. They no longer claim to have a blueprint for class struggle. They became short-sighted and rarely saw beyond protecting their respective industries. This laid the ideological foundation for nationalist protectionism of the right to take over the working class.

3. Ideological confusion within the left itself. It spent too many years away from labour movements. It spent too many years being the junior partner of the liberal mainstream. It does not only lost its identity. It also lost its framework of thinking. For example, the left adopted the liberals' moralistic perspective to politics and forgot how to objectively analyse the interests of different social classes. Some leftists even chose to see the working class as 'amoral' and 'unenlightened' and preferred the alliance with a 'rational' and 'noble' middle class with little revolutionary potential.

If the left hopes to ever regain its political energy to challenge the right, it must first review how the liberals' way of thinking has infiltrated its own. And then, it must examine whether its alliance with liberals still makes sense: perhaps, it was not in spite of, but because of this alliance, the right has risen.

(by Isaac Cheung)

原文：

講講左派近年不斷失敗的原因：

1. 長期跟自由派妥協、結盟：這相當於放棄在批判新自由主義上的 commitment，站到新自由主義得益者的邊上，暗地裡向傳統工人階級開戰，結果就是將整塊傳統的左翼階級基礎讓給了右派。

2. 知識份子與工會的 decoupling：一方面是左派知識份子的實踐基礎幾乎全面轉移至大學，造成了左翼運動的菁英化；另一方面工會則失去了長遠的階級抗爭藍圖，視野日益狹小，向保護主義傾斜，實際效果就是在工人階級之間為右翼的民族主義保護主義打下意識形態基礎。

3. 左派自己的 ideological confusion：長期脫離工運、寄生於自由派主流的結果，就是左派在喪失自己的 identity 同時，也在喪失對事物分析的能力。例如學自由派以道德化視野去分析政治，而不是唯物地分析不同社會階級的利益基礙。這導致這些左派選擇繼續將工人階級視為「不道德」和「愚昧」的，並選擇了跟那些「理智」而「高尚」、卻沒有多少革命潛力的中產階級結盟。 

左派若要重新獲得能與右派抗衝的政治能量，恐怕最首要的一件事就是去重新檢視左派思想當中自由派思考風格的影響，而第二件事就係去反省「與自由派聯盟對抗右翼」呢個策略本身仲 make 唔 make sense，定其實正正由於呢種結盟右翼勢力先可以養到今日咁大。

連結

Translation Exercise I / 翻譯練習(一)

Author: Muk Lam (in Chinese)

I could immediately tell you my opinion about every city I've ever visited. Taipei is exquisite: her scents are complex, far fuller than Hong Kong's. Oxford is historical: her architecture is sediments of bygone times, without brashness that you would find in Hong Kong. Kyoto is leisurely: the sky and clouds have space to relax and breathe above her small houses, so unlike Hong Kong, where tall towers cut the sky into pieces.

Except Hong Kong. Her scents are no simpler or more complex than Hong Kong herself. She is neither older nor younger than Hong Kong. Her buildings are neither taller nor shorter than Hong Kong's. For me, Hong Kong is the anchor point, the origin (0,0) of the coordinates upon which I place all cities. She is ground zero which no word could describe. I saw the pretentious skyscrapers that she shows outsiders, as well as the verdant fields and scenic rock formations that she carefully keeps in modest corners. I saw her vibrant luminous bars in the small hours. I saw her tiny dim rental cells. I saw corrupt people, irresponsible people; I saw humanoid tape recorders, with and without power; I also saw people who defended themselves with open umbrellas in the face of teargas. I have seen too many details to grasp her essence: I cannot find a single shallow distortive adjective to qualify Hong Kong.

I live with this city. Every day, I trace her veins, walk her contours and passageways, and try to comprehend her machinations and thoughts. In this city that never sleeps, I dream and I wake up, but my eyes do not see, for love is blind... Of the innumerable cities in all possible worlds, Hong Kong alone is the city I will never see.

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穆琳原文：

你問任何我對任何曾造訪的城市的看法，我都能馬上回答。台北是細膩的城市，她的氣味層次比香港豐富得多。牛津是古色古香的城市，她每一座建築物都沉積著歷史，不似香港那般浮躁。京都是悠閒的城市，她的房子矮矮的，藍天和白雲有空間舒展，呼吸，不像香港老用高樓把天空割成一塊塊。

可是我不能回答你香港是怎樣的城市。香港的氣味不會比香港複雜或簡單，香港的古蹟不會比香港多或少，香港的房子不會比香港高或矮，香港是錨點，是我裁判一座城市的座標（0,0），我無法用任何詞語描述原點。我見過她面對外人故作姿態的高樓華厦，見過她仔細收藏於犄角旮旯的農田奇石；見過她凌晨三點猶自燈紅酒綠的酒吧，見過她狹窄陰暗無天日的劏房；見過貪污的人，瀆職的人，當人肉錄音機或者停電的人肉錄音機的人，也見過對著催淚彈打開雨傘的人。我見過太多枝節，以致我無法掌握主幹，無法以淺薄失真的單一一個形容詞描述香港。 

我與這座城市共同生活。每天，我描繪她的肌理，遊走她的起伏之上與甬道之中，嘗試了解她的機關與巧思；在這座永不合眼的城市中，我有時夢著，有時醒著，卻永遠有目不能視，因為愛情是盲目的⋯⋯三千世界數之不盡的城市中，唯有香港是那座我看不見的城。

連結 

從林滿紅《銀線》說起

不久前訂了林滿紅的《銀線》，終於到手。早前在沈旭暉的瀛寰志略上讀到推介，就想買，卻在中英文版之間舉棋不定。一來，歷史書不免引古人文句，文言譯成現代英文，神采就不免有損；另一邊廂，近年台灣翻譯的質素......算吧，反正還是買了中譯本。即使有佶屈聱牙的歐化中文，放慢下來讀一兩遍就過去了，總比不明所指的英譯人名好。我想。況且在下中文也不見得好。

林滿紅《銀線：十九世紀的世界與中國》，2016年版

本書立論簡潔：嘉慶道光年間，中國歷史上所謂嘉道中衰期間(作者著眼者為1808至1856年)白銀大量外流，其主因並非鴉片，而是獨立運動席捲中南美，擾亂當地白銀生產，以致銀價急升。中國以白銀為通貨，本身又不甚產銀，於是陷入危機。作者據此推論道光年間士人不再埋首考據，復以經世為己任，實為對財經危機的回應；是否這樣，在下大概讀完書後也不敢有結論。

高中時好讀閒書，有陣子曾相當喜歡讀黃仁宇，竟不知天高地厚，找來《十六世紀明代中國之財政與稅收》來讀。細節大多忘了，只記得明代財政多有側面交收情事，例如農戶交稅，可以是直接把米糧送到某兵屯(!)，中央因而無從協調；後來將各類實物稅折銀，稅率有效數字竟可達七八個位......之所以是折銀的緣故，就是明代初年曾發紙鈔，但未能控制通脹，於是中國不產、政府亦無從影響其供應的碎銀，開始成為通貨，直到1935年為止。佛利民好像也說過，若非三十年代美國銀礦業遊說政府大舉購入白銀，導致中國白銀大量外流，國民政府的儲備或者可以多撐幾年，內戰結局或會不同。以歷史變數之多，自然是想當然的推論了，但白銀對中華近世史的影響，相較黃金之於1870-1970年間的歐美，實在有過之而無不及。

1896年美國大選，民主黨主張恢復銀本位，主張金本位的共和黨即以「用銀的國家，如中國、日本、墨西哥，都甚為貧困」為由，鼓動民眾反對。其實兩者無甚關係。來源：維基百科。

也多得這樣的因由，大一時才選了科經濟史。後來自忖口齒並非伶俐，為糊口計，還是轉到計量經濟那邊去，學一門手藝傍身較佳。除非讀到高考，本港中史課程主要著眼於公侯將相、改朝換代，旁及少量制度史；這固然重要，但在歷史表層以下的經濟、貨幣、社會史，其實也不妨略加介紹。

初中時，幸得張大超老師教中文、中史。圖為張老師所藏清代銀兩。
攝於2005年五月十三日，九龍華仁書院。

兩個月前，終於親身來到玻利維亞的波托西。城建在荒涼的高原上，海拔4100米。稀薄的空氣中有風沙味，教人想起撒哈拉的風，但又帶有某種金屬質的感覺。據說，該地白銀產量曾在近世佔全球六成之巨，但市面卻頗顯破落。只有舊鑄幣廠、大教堂、和修道院裏面，才能窺見舊時繁華的一瞥。城南有一座海拔4800米的孤山，名曰「些路力高」(Cerro Rico)，或者富山，就是銀礦的所在。西班牙人發現這寶山之後，就利用印加時已建立的徭役制度，驅使土著採礦，土著不夠，就從非洲運入黑奴補充。據說，三百年間，共有近八百萬人因此而死。所生產的白銀用羊駝馱到海邊，海運到墨西哥，再由定期起航的大帆船運到馬尼拉，換取中國的茶葉、絲綢、瓷器之類。

而這一切，在買賣賦稅皆用白銀的中華帝國，卻是無所聞問。

波托西(Potosi)及城南曾經盛產銀礦的富山(Cerro Rico)。筆者自攝於2016年七月六日。

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沈旭暉推介連結。以「清代貨幣戰爭」形容本書，不算準確。

另：譯文實在不敢恭維。例：「銀與銅錢通常用於不同的交易層次，這意味著人們或是只有銀或是只有銅錢或是有不同組合的銀和錢。」(頁9)。評：這意味著問題或是只出於譯者或是只出於作者或是以不同組合地出於譯者和作者。呃，尊貴的鄺議員，可以麻煩你過來三秒加幾個逗號嗎？

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關於2016立會選舉，一些多餘的話

一、喺倫敦睇到太古城選民由22:30票站截龍，堅持通宵排隊到02:45先投完票，真係好感動。

二、泛民終於順利完成新舊交替，真好。今年結果出嚟之後，嘩，五年前喺政府山打雜嘅時候係議事堂嘅泛民人士，得返涂謹申、梁耀忠、陳淑莊同長毛喺度。做過九七前立法局嘅呢，就得返涂、梁兩位。

馮檢基大概以為民協早年曾開拓新西，屯門仲有三個區議員，就冒險轉區參選，結果益咗何君堯，連保證金都輸埋，應該係佢從政三十三年以來輸得最甘嘅一次(其實都係得三次，另外果兩次係1998年立會同上年區選)。比起同佢一齊創立民協嘅李永達、陳偉業，判斷能力實在有所不及；前者四年前敗於配票失利，後者雖然未能扶黃浩銘當選，但都算係光榮引退。今日我哋為新人新氣象而高興，無咩人諗起馮檢基1983年當選市政局議員，「每個星期的新聞透視都是馮檢基」嘅時侯，只係30歲，同今年嘅梁頌恒同齡，比朱凱迪、鄭松泰都後生；而涂謹申1991年入局時，只係28歲。風流總被雨打風吹去。They were the future once.

各位非建制的立會新人，誠心祝福你哋政治生命長久，堅守理想亦知所進退，捱得到(民主的)新天地。

三、以前話投票率高有利泛民，未必啱，但不利本土派就應該係。喺新東，二月梁天琦得票66,000，得票比率係15%，如果配票得宜，夠兩席；但今次梁頌恒+陳雲嘅得票只有60,500左右，加上投票人數由四十三萬升至五十八萬，於是本土派得票比例跌到得番10.5%，根本無可能有兩席，如果分配太平均，仲有機會攬炒。說明咗啲咩？本土派嘅票大部份都係(理念上)嘅鐵票，係得咁多，吸游離票嘅能力唔高——游蕙禎、梁天琦可能係例外。要大鑼大鼓告急催出來嘅票，多數都係泛民選民。

四、地方選區方面，非建制各派全港得票55%，攞到54.3%議席(19/35)，睇落好似合理(新東配票得利贏到的，在新西輸返)，但建制派得40%，但係有45.7%議席(16/35)。發生咩事？就係所謂「中間派」(主要係方國珊同埋王維基)5%應該有嘅一兩席，都落係建制手上也。不過比起上屆泛民得票56%，得席位51.4%(18/35)，算協調得好咗架啦。

五、唔該唔好再怪中聯辦配票。佢哋都唔好意思認叻啦。主要問題係2012年之後，泛民各門派都唔肯協調，攬炒機會大增。我下面列左泛民/非建制喺地區直選嘅得票(A)同議席比率(B)。直到2008年，泛民主派選舉策略係一路好過建制架。四年前，連譚耀宗都認「(配票)不是最叻，我們都是學人哋」。果年出事，好大程度要怪公民黨貪心，以余若薇、陳淑莊排第二，結果嘥咗好多票。今次泛民協調差成咁，仍然力保不失，就知道建制冇大家講到咁勁啦。

真正要擔心嘅係咩？你睇下(A)行，非建制得票比例係有跌無升㗎。就算計埋王維基嘅票入泛民，都係56.5%，同2012差唔多。梁振英倒行逆施四年，都係咁嘅成績，我怕咁樣落去，唔好彩嘅話真係會久守必失。

年份  (A)      (B)      (B)-(A)
1998  66.4% 75.0% 8.6%
2000  60.6% 66.7% 6.1%
2004  60.5% 60.0% -0.5%
2008  59.5% 63.3% 3.8%
2012  56.2% 51.4% -4.8%
2016  55.0% 54.3% -0.7%

六、雷動計劃唔見得有用，但亦唔見得害咗泛民：九西建制採守勢，只派蔣麗芸、梁美芬出戰，非建制係咪都有四席，問題係邊四位；港島有王維基搞局，泛民+本土得票跌穿50%，非建制名單有咁多支，三席係上限。我唔知無雷動嘅話，王維基會唔會喺泛民手上執到第六席，但起碼依家冇。

新界方面，新東非建制得票57%，得六席，唔關雷動事，係楊岳橋、長毛配票有效，加上好彩。鄭家富係攪局，冇咗佢可以試第七席，但比較有機會嘅係范國威上，長毛落——57%想博七席，其實要好好好彩。新西係太多非建制名單。李卓人、馮檢基係現任，黃潤達要繼承梁耀忠；黃浩銘想繼承陳偉業，結果冇一個可以勸退。加上朱凱迪吸票過多(鄭松泰嘅票就算啦，係咪都唔會過畀泛民)，咁咪攬炒囉。雷動呢區根本無咩影響力：叫人保郭家麒、黃浩銘，結果啲人就湧去投朱凱迪。

不過，雖然雷動執行上好難話佢好(戴耀廷有邊次既安排係妥當架？)，但起碼話到俾全世界聽，配票真係很重要，以後可以再改善。當然，唔好再俾戴耀廷搞......

七、九東係個好有象徵意義嘅死結。無關雷動。如果要怪，就怪九東只有5席，當選門檻最高。黃洋達/本土派嘅支持，足夠阻泛民第三席入，但唔足夠自己當選，只好益咗建制。如果九東要配票比一個人阻建制攞第三席，呢個人要係本土泛民選民都接受到嘅：即係唔係黃洋達，亦都唔係譚得志。佢哋之間嘅私怨太多。陳澤滔果一類人士可以係（雷動咁多泛民選民，都會試圖配票比游蕙禎啦），但好難說服兩邊嘅人一齊支持一個民調排第八嘅人。

一啲個人經驗：我都勸過人投黃洋達，其中不乏介乎泛民本土之間，如果住新東會考慮陳雲，住新西會考慮鄭松泰嘅朋友，但佢哋對黃洋達嘅憎恨，及得上本土派「寧投建制，勿投泛民」嘅情緒。佢哋寧願試圖保快必，寧願俾謝偉俊入，都唔願意投黃洋達。係架，黃洋達其實同榴槤差唔多，鍾意嘅人就鍾意，唔鍾意嘅真係會掉頭走，而鍾意食榴槤嘅人嘅比例呢.... 新界兩區就夠用嘅，九龍東就只夠攬炒。呢個係熱普城性格使然。

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泛民五人棄選有感

泛民五人宣佈棄選。不少朋友不以為然，覺得五人背棄選民者有之，嘲諷泛民各黨早知今日(要棄保)，何必當初(出咁多隊)者有之。我又唔會咁睇。

過去個幾月，大家咪當係泛民搞咗一場以民調和選情為基礎嘅初選囉。俾你出黎選，拉足一個月票，選情都係無起色，咁先會接受俾人勸退。

人是咁的；就算過咗一個沙漠之後，都只係另外一個沙漠，唔試過，唔會甘心放棄。

你睇，1991年民主派聯席會議，協調二人出選新界南，梁耀忠第二，陳偉業第三，陳拍案離場，照樣參選，以些微票數超過梁入局。兩人後來都晉身尊貴，但事隔二十年後，梁仍然耿耿於懷。00年代初民主黨少壯派出走，原因一樣。

如果今次泛民選民棄保反應夠快，那麼「兄弟登山，各自努力」一兩個月，最後一分鐘先來根據歷次民調和在地選情決定棄保，以後或者成為慣例，也未嘗不可。要不然，每次都係幾個大佬(或者頂多幾百個代表)圍爐協調，啲二線人物又不甘長期做綠葉，私怨就日積月累，長遠嚟講......唉，香港有直選議席都二三十年啦，私怨誤事，大家仲見唔少咩。

不過如果選民反應唔切，就不妙了。🙈

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