從林滿紅《銀線》說起

不久前訂了林滿紅的《銀線》，終於到手。早前在沈旭暉的瀛寰志略上讀到推介，就想買，卻在中英文版之間舉棋不定。一來，歷史書不免引古人文句，文言譯成現代英文，神采就不免有損；另一邊廂，近年台灣翻譯的質素......算吧，反正還是買了中譯本。即使有佶屈聱牙的歐化中文，放慢下來讀一兩遍就過去了，總比不明所指的英譯人名好。我想。況且在下中文也不見得好。

林滿紅《銀線：十九世紀的世界與中國》，2016年版

本書立論簡潔：嘉慶道光年間，中國歷史上所謂嘉道中衰期間(作者著眼者為1808至1856年)白銀大量外流，其主因並非鴉片，而是獨立運動席捲中南美，擾亂當地白銀生產，以致銀價急升。中國以白銀為通貨，本身又不甚產銀，於是陷入危機。作者據此推論道光年間士人不再埋首考據，復以經世為己任，實為對財經危機的回應；是否這樣，在下大概讀完書後也不敢有結論。

高中時好讀閒書，有陣子曾相當喜歡讀黃仁宇，竟不知天高地厚，找來《十六世紀明代中國之財政與稅收》來讀。細節大多忘了，只記得明代財政多有側面交收情事，例如農戶交稅，可以是直接把米糧送到某兵屯(!)，中央因而無從協調；後來將各類實物稅折銀，稅率有效數字竟可達七八個位......之所以是折銀的緣故，就是明代初年曾發紙鈔，但未能控制通脹，於是中國不產、政府亦無從影響其供應的碎銀，開始成為通貨，直到1935年為止。佛利民好像也說過，若非三十年代美國銀礦業遊說政府大舉購入白銀，導致中國白銀大量外流，國民政府的儲備或者可以多撐幾年，內戰結局或會不同。以歷史變數之多，自然是想當然的推論了，但白銀對中華近世史的影響，相較黃金之於1870-1970年間的歐美，實在有過之而無不及。

1896年美國大選，民主黨主張恢復銀本位，主張金本位的共和黨即以「用銀的國家，如中國、日本、墨西哥，都甚為貧困」為由，鼓動民眾反對。其實兩者無甚關係。來源：維基百科。

也多得這樣的因由，大一時才選了科經濟史。後來自忖口齒並非伶俐，為糊口計，還是轉到計量經濟那邊去，學一門手藝傍身較佳。除非讀到高考，本港中史課程主要著眼於公侯將相、改朝換代，旁及少量制度史；這固然重要，但在歷史表層以下的經濟、貨幣、社會史，其實也不妨略加介紹。

初中時，幸得張大超老師教中文、中史。圖為張老師所藏清代銀兩。
攝於2005年五月十三日，九龍華仁書院。

兩個月前，終於親身來到玻利維亞的波托西。城建在荒涼的高原上，海拔4100米。稀薄的空氣中有風沙味，教人想起撒哈拉的風，但又帶有某種金屬質的感覺。據說，該地白銀產量曾在近世佔全球六成之巨，但市面卻頗顯破落。只有舊鑄幣廠、大教堂、和修道院裏面，才能窺見舊時繁華的一瞥。城南有一座海拔4800米的孤山，名曰「些路力高」(Cerro Rico)，或者富山，就是銀礦的所在。西班牙人發現這寶山之後，就利用印加時已建立的徭役制度，驅使土著採礦，土著不夠，就從非洲運入黑奴補充。據說，三百年間，共有近八百萬人因此而死。所生產的白銀用羊駝馱到海邊，海運到墨西哥，再由定期起航的大帆船運到馬尼拉，換取中國的茶葉、絲綢、瓷器之類。

而這一切，在買賣賦稅皆用白銀的中華帝國，卻是無所聞問。

波托西(Potosi)及城南曾經盛產銀礦的富山(Cerro Rico)。筆者自攝於2016年七月六日。

============================================

沈旭暉推介連結。以「清代貨幣戰爭」形容本書，不算準確。

另：譯文實在不敢恭維。例：「銀與銅錢通常用於不同的交易層次，這意味著人們或是只有銀或是只有銅錢或是有不同組合的銀和錢。」(頁9)。評：這意味著問題或是只出於譯者或是只出於作者或是以不同組合地出於譯者和作者。呃，尊貴的鄺議員，可以麻煩你過來三秒加幾個逗號嗎？

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關於2016立會選舉，一些多餘的話

一、喺倫敦睇到太古城選民由22:30票站截龍，堅持通宵排隊到02:45先投完票，真係好感動。

二、泛民終於順利完成新舊交替，真好。今年結果出嚟之後，嘩，五年前喺政府山打雜嘅時候係議事堂嘅泛民人士，得返涂謹申、梁耀忠、陳淑莊同長毛喺度。做過九七前立法局嘅呢，就得返涂、梁兩位。

馮檢基大概以為民協早年曾開拓新西，屯門仲有三個區議員，就冒險轉區參選，結果益咗何君堯，連保證金都輸埋，應該係佢從政三十三年以來輸得最甘嘅一次(其實都係得三次，另外果兩次係1998年立會同上年區選)。比起同佢一齊創立民協嘅李永達、陳偉業，判斷能力實在有所不及；前者四年前敗於配票失利，後者雖然未能扶黃浩銘當選，但都算係光榮引退。今日我哋為新人新氣象而高興，無咩人諗起馮檢基1983年當選市政局議員，「每個星期的新聞透視都是馮檢基」嘅時侯，只係30歲，同今年嘅梁頌恒同齡，比朱凱迪、鄭松泰都後生；而涂謹申1991年入局時，只係28歲。風流總被雨打風吹去。They were the future once.

各位非建制的立會新人，誠心祝福你哋政治生命長久，堅守理想亦知所進退，捱得到(民主的)新天地。

三、以前話投票率高有利泛民，未必啱，但不利本土派就應該係。喺新東，二月梁天琦得票66,000，得票比率係15%，如果配票得宜，夠兩席；但今次梁頌恒+陳雲嘅得票只有60,500左右，加上投票人數由四十三萬升至五十八萬，於是本土派得票比例跌到得番10.5%，根本無可能有兩席，如果分配太平均，仲有機會攬炒。說明咗啲咩？本土派嘅票大部份都係(理念上)嘅鐵票，係得咁多，吸游離票嘅能力唔高——游蕙禎、梁天琦可能係例外。要大鑼大鼓告急催出來嘅票，多數都係泛民選民。

四、地方選區方面，非建制各派全港得票55%，攞到54.3%議席(19/35)，睇落好似合理(新東配票得利贏到的，在新西輸返)，但建制派得40%，但係有45.7%議席(16/35)。發生咩事？就係所謂「中間派」(主要係方國珊同埋王維基)5%應該有嘅一兩席，都落係建制手上也。不過比起上屆泛民得票56%，得席位51.4%(18/35)，算協調得好咗架啦。

五、唔該唔好再怪中聯辦配票。佢哋都唔好意思認叻啦。主要問題係2012年之後，泛民各門派都唔肯協調，攬炒機會大增。我下面列左泛民/非建制喺地區直選嘅得票(A)同議席比率(B)。直到2008年，泛民主派選舉策略係一路好過建制架。四年前，連譚耀宗都認「(配票)不是最叻，我們都是學人哋」。果年出事，好大程度要怪公民黨貪心，以余若薇、陳淑莊排第二，結果嘥咗好多票。今次泛民協調差成咁，仍然力保不失，就知道建制冇大家講到咁勁啦。

真正要擔心嘅係咩？你睇下(A)行，非建制得票比例係有跌無升㗎。就算計埋王維基嘅票入泛民，都係56.5%，同2012差唔多。梁振英倒行逆施四年，都係咁嘅成績，我怕咁樣落去，唔好彩嘅話真係會久守必失。

年份  (A)      (B)      (B)-(A)
1998  66.4% 75.0% 8.6%
2000  60.6% 66.7% 6.1%
2004  60.5% 60.0% -0.5%
2008  59.5% 63.3% 3.8%
2012  56.2% 51.4% -4.8%
2016  55.0% 54.3% -0.7%

六、雷動計劃唔見得有用，但亦唔見得害咗泛民：九西建制採守勢，只派蔣麗芸、梁美芬出戰，非建制係咪都有四席，問題係邊四位；港島有王維基搞局，泛民+本土得票跌穿50%，非建制名單有咁多支，三席係上限。我唔知無雷動嘅話，王維基會唔會喺泛民手上執到第六席，但起碼依家冇。

新界方面，新東非建制得票57%，得六席，唔關雷動事，係楊岳橋、長毛配票有效，加上好彩。鄭家富係攪局，冇咗佢可以試第七席，但比較有機會嘅係范國威上，長毛落——57%想博七席，其實要好好好彩。新西係太多非建制名單。李卓人、馮檢基係現任，黃潤達要繼承梁耀忠；黃浩銘想繼承陳偉業，結果冇一個可以勸退。加上朱凱迪吸票過多(鄭松泰嘅票就算啦，係咪都唔會過畀泛民)，咁咪攬炒囉。雷動呢區根本無咩影響力：叫人保郭家麒、黃浩銘，結果啲人就湧去投朱凱迪。

不過，雖然雷動執行上好難話佢好(戴耀廷有邊次既安排係妥當架？)，但起碼話到俾全世界聽，配票真係很重要，以後可以再改善。當然，唔好再俾戴耀廷搞......

七、九東係個好有象徵意義嘅死結。無關雷動。如果要怪，就怪九東只有5席，當選門檻最高。黃洋達/本土派嘅支持，足夠阻泛民第三席入，但唔足夠自己當選，只好益咗建制。如果九東要配票比一個人阻建制攞第三席，呢個人要係本土泛民選民都接受到嘅：即係唔係黃洋達，亦都唔係譚得志。佢哋之間嘅私怨太多。陳澤滔果一類人士可以係（雷動咁多泛民選民，都會試圖配票比游蕙禎啦），但好難說服兩邊嘅人一齊支持一個民調排第八嘅人。

一啲個人經驗：我都勸過人投黃洋達，其中不乏介乎泛民本土之間，如果住新東會考慮陳雲，住新西會考慮鄭松泰嘅朋友，但佢哋對黃洋達嘅憎恨，及得上本土派「寧投建制，勿投泛民」嘅情緒。佢哋寧願試圖保快必，寧願俾謝偉俊入，都唔願意投黃洋達。係架，黃洋達其實同榴槤差唔多，鍾意嘅人就鍾意，唔鍾意嘅真係會掉頭走，而鍾意食榴槤嘅人嘅比例呢.... 新界兩區就夠用嘅，九龍東就只夠攬炒。呢個係熱普城性格使然。

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泛民五人棄選有感

泛民五人宣佈棄選。不少朋友不以為然，覺得五人背棄選民者有之，嘲諷泛民各黨早知今日(要棄保)，何必當初(出咁多隊)者有之。我又唔會咁睇。

過去個幾月，大家咪當係泛民搞咗一場以民調和選情為基礎嘅初選囉。俾你出黎選，拉足一個月票，選情都係無起色，咁先會接受俾人勸退。

人是咁的；就算過咗一個沙漠之後，都只係另外一個沙漠，唔試過，唔會甘心放棄。

你睇，1991年民主派聯席會議，協調二人出選新界南，梁耀忠第二，陳偉業第三，陳拍案離場，照樣參選，以些微票數超過梁入局。兩人後來都晉身尊貴，但事隔二十年後，梁仍然耿耿於懷。00年代初民主黨少壯派出走，原因一樣。

如果今次泛民選民棄保反應夠快，那麼「兄弟登山，各自努力」一兩個月，最後一分鐘先來根據歷次民調和在地選情決定棄保，以後或者成為慣例，也未嘗不可。要不然，每次都係幾個大佬(或者頂多幾百個代表)圍爐協調，啲二線人物又不甘長期做綠葉，私怨就日積月累，長遠嚟講......唉，香港有直選議席都二三十年啦，私怨誤事，大家仲見唔少咩。

不過如果選民反應唔切，就不妙了。🙈

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Pope Francis, Gandalf, and the two Morias

It is in the news that Pope Francis has taken 12 Syrian migrants from the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos⁽¹⁾ back to the Vatican with him. This is, of course, a very kind act. But, Moria camp? Moria??

For me at least, the very name Moria has become irreversibly associated with the vast legendary underground Dwarven city beneath the Misty Mountains in the Lord of the Rings. Oh, and in its ruins a certain wizard, in a robe that was not unlike Pope Francis's, delivered a message of an exact opposite meaning to a creature which some might term a war refugee⁽²⁾.

From the film The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (2001). Source

No wonder a Guardian writer called Tolkien's work 'political fantasy' with 'reactionary politics at the heart'. The newspaper is very internally consistent indeed.

Notes:
⁽¹⁾ On an unrelated note, the island also lent its name to an essential component of the GLEE movement which every one of us should be part of and support.
⁽²⁾ The Balrog was a survivor from the war against the first Dark Lord, Morgoth. As set out in The Silmarillion,

"The meeting of the hosts of the West and of the North is named the Great Battle, and the War of Wrath. There was marshalled the whole power of the Throne of Morgoth, and it had become great beyond count, so that Anfauglith could not contain it; and all the North was aflame with war. But it availed him not. The Balrogs were destroyed, save some few that fled and hid themselves in caverns inaccessible at the roots of the earth [...]"

新東補選結果有感

新界東補選結果出爐，楊岳橋險勝周浩鼎，令人欣慰。

有兩件事值得留意。首先，梁天琦得票66,524，或總票數的15.4%。在2012年被視為激進民主派的梁國雄、陳志全、范國威的得票總和也不過是24.7%。換言之，本土派正式成為香港政治的主流的一部分；而首當其衝的，則是曾經被視為激進的社民連和人民力量，以至新民盟。如果毋須因旺角事件服刑，梁天琦可望於九月入立會，取代涂謹申成為香港史上最年輕的立法會議員。本土派或可贏得5-7個立會議席。

此外，楊岳橋、梁天琦的得票加起來只有52.6%，較2012年立會改選時泛民在新界東所得的56.8%為低。而黃成智的得票，剛好就是4%。這也顯示出溫和泛民的兩難：在激進的一翼，他們面對要和泛民、建制「三分天下」的本土派；但如果過份迎合網上以年輕人為主的輿論，則可能進退失據。畢竟，在1991年涂謹申、馮檢基首次入局時支持他們的選民，今日大概已經四五六十歲。而我懷疑，這些選民普遍不反對民主進程，但對激進行動更有保留。如果他們從民主派的最溫和一翼轉投所謂「中間路線」的候選人，例如黃成智之類，其實並不令人詫異。

選委會數據顯示，香港選民的中位數年齡介乎50至55歲之間。溫和泛民與其和本土派人士爭奪他們已經失去的激進票源，不如多想想怎樣去保住民主派從八九十年代積累的支持比較好。畢竟，2000至2008年，泛民得票率都在60%左右，到了2012年，已下降至56%。如果民主黨、民協甚至公民黨繼續找不到自己的定位，或被視為激進派的一員，溫和民主派的票可能會逐步向「中間路線」流失。對於香港民主進程而言，這並不是好事。

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新東補選亂估

最近新東補選成了臉書熱話；尤其是梁天琦、楊岳橋支持者的熱情，實在令人感動。在下不在香港，無法親身感受選舉氣氛，唯有找來相關數據聊以自娛，順便公諸同好。分析多有淺薄之處，見笑了。

新界東選民可以分為三組：

(一) 2012年立會改選時，新界東共有十七名候選人，各有若干選民支持。從統計處數據可以推算這四年間18歲以上人士的死亡率。若假設離世選民按得票分佈於十七名候選人的支持者當中，並將其剔除，又忽略遷出/遷入新界東人口的因素，則今日22歲以上、尚在的新東選民，可按其2012年的投票取向細分為17類，共佔投票者92.3%。
(二) 年齡介乎18-21歲的選民，即所謂「首投族」。以選委會及統計處數據推算，約佔選民5.2%。
(三) 在這四年間居港滿七年的新移民。以選委會及統計處數據推算，約佔選民1.5%。

我們不妨推論：

• 投票率與2012年相若。
• 劉志成、梁思豪可以平分2012年梁安琪、何民傑、陳國強三人的得票數。沒有理由的，但這幾千位選民真的無從歸類，唯有假設品味獨特的人會繼續獨特下去......吧。
• 黃成智可以取回他2012年的得票數的70%。另外的30%，則由楊岳橋、方國珊、周浩鼎平分。其實可能有點高估泛民選民轉投建制的比率。不過黃成智的支持者本來就是2012年泛民選民中最保守的部分，經過佔領運動、旺角衝突之後轉投建制，這樣估計比較安全。
• 方國珊地區工作紮實，應可取回其2012年的票數。
• 經濟動力邱榮光、自由黨田北俊的支持者多屬中間派中間收入或中產人士，蛇齋餅糉效力不大，相信轉投周浩鼎的人不多。不妨假設2012支持這兩張名單的選民有60%轉投方國珊，20%投周浩鼎、20%放棄投票。
• 龐愛蘭較親建制，但也有試圖建立獨立形象。不妨假設其得票數有70%投周浩鼎，30%放棄投票。
• 民建聯、工聯會選舉工程綿密，地區福利工作聞名遐邇，可以假設2012年投工聯會葉偉明、民建聯葛珮帆、陳克勤的選民會全投周浩鼎。
• 新界東居港滿七年的新移民較受建制地區工作影響，當是70%投周浩鼎，20%投楊岳橋、餘下的由黃成智、方國珊平分好了。
• 首投族較傾向不滿政府，保守推斷，周浩鼎在這組選民當中最多得票10%。以最近中大學生會選舉的結果推斷，梁天琦、楊岳橋分別取得首投族當中60%、30%的選票，應該不算不合理。

那麼計算顯示：

(a) 如果梁天琦可以全取當年被視為激進民主派的梁國雄、陳志全、范國威的得票數，再加上溫和民主派（劉慧卿、張超雄、蔡耀昌、湯家驊、龐一鳴）得票數的12%以上，則會勝出。
(b) 如果楊岳橋可以全取溫和民主派（劉慧卿、張超雄、蔡耀昌、湯家驊、龐一鳴）2012年的得票數，加上梁國雄、陳志全、范國威得票的8%以上，則會勝出。
(c) 若果梁楊之票數分佈介乎(a)、(b)之間，或者民建聯能夠取得更多2012年投經濟動力、自由黨的選民支持，周浩鼎就很有可能漁人得利而勝出了。

另外一些個人想法：

• 方國珊當選機會較低，但今次補選積累的氣勢有助她九月入立會。
• 其實周浩鼎、方國珊、梁天琦、楊岳橋四人如果九月重返新東參選，看來都可以當選。

想要Excel試算表自己沙盤推演一下的朋友，請臉書私訊在下。

(新界東補選候選人包括劉志成、黃成智、周浩鼎、梁思豪、方國珊、梁天琦、楊岳橋。)

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On Henry Litton’s speech at the FCC

Last Wednesday The Honourable Justice Henry Litton, former Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association and retired Court of Final Appeal judge, gave a speech at the Foreign Correspondents' Club [video recording]. It was predictably controversial in the local Chinese and English press, and was replied to by politicians and commentators of various stripes.

This is my attempt to add to that debate. I am not a lawyer and have no formal legal training whatsoever. I write from a layman's perspective. I may make errors in my transcriptions, and I apologise in advance shall any arise.

1. Curiously, the local media of both affiliations and languages chose to downplay or even omit Henry Litton's key message: after 2047 the international guarantees will lapse. Hong Kong's Basic Law, legal system, and way of life will be a matter of grace for the Chinese legislature. In his own words,

"What has Hong Kong got to offer? When such discussions about the future of Hong Kong [beyond 2047] once again take place, there will be some who will argue that English should cease to be an official language, and if at that time the common law system is seen to be flabby, slow, costly, pedantic, obscure, the question will be asked how can such a system be put forward as a model for a global financial and business centre... [By then] Hong Kong will then be on its own. There will not be another sovereign power alongside, contending for the continuation of our governing system and lifestyle, as Britain did in 1983."

Mr Litton was right to point out this grave matter. That is, unless there were to be drastic changes to the body politic of China in the next 32 years, Hong Kong will have to show China that preserving its socioeconomic system will bring China more benefit than cost. But while he identified the disease, his diagnosis of where Chinese interest lies was sometimes tangential, and as we would see, as a result his prescriptions may not be the most appropriate.

2. Mr Litton seems to believe the Chinese government would like to see the legal system to be more approachable to the local Chinese population . There is no evidence for that. In contrary, Hong Kong's value lies in being the place where China can deal with the rest of the world; if the legal system could serve this better by remaining operating in English, then that is where Chinese interest lies too. Yet Henry Litton suggested that

"...some 80% of the population governed by the common law do not speak English... the judgments handed down by the court should be brief, direct, written in simple English so that they can, if necessary, be translated into Chinese. Obscurity spells injustice." 

He then went on to note that in a certain recent judicial review (JR) case, the High Court referred to persuasive precedents from jurisdictions as far as Nigeria, Lesotho, and South Africa, and asked how the judgment could possibly be translated into Chinese. This comment is intriguing. Should the African precedents be not persuasive, then the critique should be directed to the line of reasoning, not translatability; should they be persuasive, then they should be referred to. The technical difficulty he noted - translation into Chinese - is hardly material in the face of persuasive precedents that should be rightly cited, no matter wherefrom. It could easily be surmounted by adding footnotes to the Chinese version of the judgment that briefly describe the underlying cases.

3. He certainly thought the current court operation inefficient or even inappropriate. He recalled 1995 case of Hui Kin-Hong (許健康). Hui, a civil servant in the Lands Department at the time, was charged of possession of unexplained property, and hence in breach of s. 10 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Hui then applied for judicial review on the grounds that the relevant section were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and should be struck down, as the charged officials were presumed to be guilty unless they explain the source of their property to the court's satisfaction. Henry Litton then recalled, as he sat at the Court of Appeal then, he only considered the history and actual conditions of Hong Kong, and did not look for persuasive precedents from all around the world. The judgment, written by Kemal Bokhary, was only eight pages long.

I do not think this is a fair comparison. As Henry Litton himself noted, in 1995, there were 'no trumpets, no fanfare, just the ordinary work of an appellate court'. That world, in which a judge of European extraction could just outline the rationale behind his judgment in a few pages, is long behind us. The Hong Kong society now demands more from the judiciary - in particular in cases with a high level of public interest. It is only reasonable for judges to be more detailed in their writing and consult relevant precedents in other jurisdictions more widely. After all, justice has to be seen to be done.

4. Around two thirds of his speech then used the proliferation of judicial review as an example that Hong Kong's legal system has become flabby and slow. As I understand from his speech, applicants for judicial review must first obtain leave to do so from a judge at the Court of First Instance, and such leave should only be granted if there were an arguable case.

He was critical of the approach the responsible judges took in three recent proposed JR applications - TVB's application with regards to granting new television licences, and Kwok Cheuk-Kin (郭卓堅) and Yvonne Leung's (梁麗幗) applications in connection to the first and second stage public consultation in the political reform process respectively. In all three cases, the responsible judge summoned the lawyers of both the applicant and the putative respondents to a hearing, and to argue whether there were a reasonably arguable case. He considered this unnecessary and inefficient - if there were no arguable case, then it should be summarily dismissed with a single paragraph. In his words, 'zero adds up to zero'.

But should the judge have done what he suggested, what would the judiciary become in the public's eyes? Again, justice has to be seen to be done, especially in judicial review cases where the local society has divergent views on. It remains puzzling to me that Henry Litton, one of the most respected former judges of Hong Kong, seemed to be quite willing to risk public confidence in the judiciary for some efficiency savings in court time. To do so would be an error, and would not add value to the Hong Kong legal system in the eyes of China or anyone.

5. He alleged that Yvonne Leung's application for judicial review was just an act of grandstanding, has no arguable case, and the court's hearings were a waste of time, and such act should be condemned by court. While I concur that Miss Leung's act was mainly grandstanding, I cannot see why a summary dismissal or even a condemnation by the court would boost public confidence in the judiciary. In politically controversial cases such as this one, it is commendable that the court has chosen to err on the side of caution, and chose inefficiency over potential perception of unfairness.

6. He also said, in what sounded to me a light-hearted bad joke that nobody laughed on the spot, that Yvonne Leung might have wanted to put the fact that she had sued the Chief Executive into her CV. What Henry Litton meant was that the object of JR, the second-round consultation on political reform, was undertaken by the three-person Taskforce on Political Development - the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, and the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, and the CE should not be listed as a putative respondent. But as the judgment set out, Miss Leung did not list the Chief Executive as a putative respondent; she listed him as a putative interested party. Instead of dealing a fatal blow against the former president of HKUSU, the Honourable Justice seems to have hit a straw man instead.

The emphasis that so many media from both sides of the spectrum attached to this remark, and their failure to check the facts, reflects the sorry state of the press in Hong Kong today.

7. Towards the end of his speech The Honourable Justice made a disheartening remark with regards to the 2011 judicial review case on the environmental impact assessment around the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge project. In his own words,

"... The judgments are so obscure that no one can understands them. Yet if there's one thing that symbolises the relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, it would be that bridge. Delay on the Hong Kong end must have had impact on the project as a whole. How was this explained to the Mainland authorities concerned?"

The Honourable Justice may well consider the case vexatious, not reasonably arguable, or should simply be summarily dismissed at the first instance. But the quote above is the thin end of the wedge. It is akin to suggesting that apart from considering the relative merits of the arguments that the parties presented, the court should also take into account the reaction of some authorities in a neighbouring jurisdiction. Should this become the prevalent view in Hong Kong's appellate courts, what would become of the public and international confidence that the judiciary currently enjoy?

8. His conclusion is worth repeating too.

"The legal system in many instances is wrapped in obscurity, clothed in mumble-jumble, suffocating under citations, and drowning in irrelevance. The question - the harsh question - must be asked. Is the Hong Kong judiciary sleepwalking towards 2047, wandering in a dream world of its own, a world of authorities, legal texts, precedents, black letter laws, as if those were the entire substance and reality that exist, detached from the people whose only language is Chinese? ... As 2047 closes in, what Hong Kong needs is present to the world as a robust, vigorous legal system, one that is clear-cut, expressed in language easily understood."

I agree and fully support that the Hong Kong judiciary should modernise, use Chinese more, and conduct its proceedings in a way that is more accessible to the general public. On the other hand, the Hong Kong legal system should also remain valuable to the Chinese government, so that its preservation could be justified beyond 2047. But these are two important yet distinct issues. The former is a reform that has been long overdue; come 2047 or not, the system should stop alienating members of the public who are not proficient in English as soon as possible. On the other hand, whether China has an interest in preserving the common law system has everything to do with its commercial and political considerations, and very little to do with whether it were approachable to the local ethnic Chinese population or not. We should not confuse one important question with another.

9. On an unrelated point - the impact of the economic policy adopted by successive Hong Kong governments in the last 30 years was described by the Honourable Justice so eloquently:

"We don't have gas, oil, minerals, [or] coal; we have no industry to speak of; the verdant rice fields of Shatin, Tai Po, and Yuen Long are long gone; our seas are cleared of fish; we import water from the East River and electricity from Daya Bay."

10. A final note. Despite all of Mr Litton's suggestions for moving forward and change, the whole affair sounded more like a far echo from a bygone era. His view that judges should just hand down judgments without fully explaining their line of reasoning even in the most controversial cases is unmistakably colonial. In a mirror image of how local ethnic Chinese often failed to differentiate the divergent agendas of the British Government in London, the colonial service officials in Hong Kong, and local merchants of British descent such as the Swire and Keswick families - lumping them under the 'British' bracket - the Honourable Justice might have inadvertently made the mistake of equating the Chinese government's interest with that of the monolingual Chinese-speaking residents of Hong Kong. This is unlikely to be the case. Even the setting was that of the yesteryear: what could be more nostalgic than a former judge of Eurasian descent delivering a speech in English in, of all places, the Foreign Correspondents' Club?

And this elitist, condescending, 'I know better than thou' attitude of an older day is exactly what Hong Kong has to move forward from.

P.S. I would like to thank Valerie CHAN, Chun Ho LAI, and MUK Lam for the kindly discussions. All errors are mine.

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