Pope Francis, Gandalf, and the two Morias

It is in the news that Pope Francis has taken 12 Syrian migrants from the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos⁽¹⁾ back to the Vatican with him. This is, of course, a very kind act. But, Moria camp? Moria??

For me at least, the very name Moria has become irreversibly associated with the vast legendary underground Dwarven city beneath the Misty Mountains in the Lord of the Rings. Oh, and in its ruins a certain wizard, in a robe that was not unlike Pope Francis's, delivered a message of an exact opposite meaning to a creature which some might term a war refugee⁽²⁾.

From the film The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring (2001). Source

No wonder a Guardian writer called Tolkien's work 'political fantasy' with 'reactionary politics at the heart'. The newspaper is very internally consistent indeed.

Notes:
⁽¹⁾ On an unrelated note, the island also lent its name to an essential component of the GLEE movement which every one of us should be part of and support.
⁽²⁾ The Balrog was a survivor from the war against the first Dark Lord, Morgoth. As set out in The Silmarillion,

"The meeting of the hosts of the West and of the North is named the Great Battle, and the War of Wrath. There was marshalled the whole power of the Throne of Morgoth, and it had become great beyond count, so that Anfauglith could not contain it; and all the North was aflame with war. But it availed him not. The Balrogs were destroyed, save some few that fled and hid themselves in caverns inaccessible at the roots of the earth [...]"

新東補選結果有感

新界東補選結果出爐，楊岳橋險勝周浩鼎，令人欣慰。

有兩件事值得留意。首先，梁天琦得票66,524，或總票數的15.4%。在2012年被視為激進民主派的梁國雄、陳志全、范國威的得票總和也不過是24.7%。換言之，本土派正式成為香港政治的主流的一部分；而首當其衝的，則是曾經被視為激進的社民連和人民力量，以至新民盟。如果毋須因旺角事件服刑，梁天琦可望於九月入立會，取代涂謹申成為香港史上最年輕的立法會議員。本土派或可贏得5-7個立會議席。

此外，楊岳橋、梁天琦的得票加起來只有52.6%，較2012年立會改選時泛民在新界東所得的56.8%為低。而黃成智的得票，剛好就是4%。這也顯示出溫和泛民的兩難：在激進的一翼，他們面對要和泛民、建制「三分天下」的本土派；但如果過份迎合網上以年輕人為主的輿論，則可能進退失據。畢竟，在1991年涂謹申、馮檢基首次入局時支持他們的選民，今日大概已經四五六十歲。而我懷疑，這些選民普遍不反對民主進程，但對激進行動更有保留。如果他們從民主派的最溫和一翼轉投所謂「中間路線」的候選人，例如黃成智之類，其實並不令人詫異。

選委會數據顯示，香港選民的中位數年齡介乎50至55歲之間。溫和泛民與其和本土派人士爭奪他們已經失去的激進票源，不如多想想怎樣去保住民主派從八九十年代積累的支持比較好。畢竟，2000至2008年，泛民得票率都在60%左右，到了2012年，已下降至56%。如果民主黨、民協甚至公民黨繼續找不到自己的定位，或被視為激進派的一員，溫和民主派的票可能會逐步向「中間路線」流失。對於香港民主進程而言，這並不是好事。

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新東補選亂估

最近新東補選成了臉書熱話；尤其是梁天琦、楊岳橋支持者的熱情，實在令人感動。在下不在香港，無法親身感受選舉氣氛，唯有找來相關數據聊以自娛，順便公諸同好。分析多有淺薄之處，見笑了。

新界東選民可以分為三組：

(一) 2012年立會改選時，新界東共有十七名候選人，各有若干選民支持。從統計處數據可以推算這四年間18歲以上人士的死亡率。若假設離世選民按得票分佈於十七名候選人的支持者當中，並將其剔除，又忽略遷出/遷入新界東人口的因素，則今日22歲以上、尚在的新東選民，可按其2012年的投票取向細分為17類，共佔投票者92.3%。
(二) 年齡介乎18-21歲的選民，即所謂「首投族」。以選委會及統計處數據推算，約佔選民5.2%。
(三) 在這四年間居港滿七年的新移民。以選委會及統計處數據推算，約佔選民1.5%。

我們不妨推論：

• 投票率與2012年相若。
• 劉志成、梁思豪可以平分2012年梁安琪、何民傑、陳國強三人的得票數。沒有理由的，但這幾千位選民真的無從歸類，唯有假設品味獨特的人會繼續獨特下去......吧。
• 黃成智可以取回他2012年的得票數的70%。另外的30%，則由楊岳橋、方國珊、周浩鼎平分。其實可能有點高估泛民選民轉投建制的比率。不過黃成智的支持者本來就是2012年泛民選民中最保守的部分，經過佔領運動、旺角衝突之後轉投建制，這樣估計比較安全。
• 方國珊地區工作紮實，應可取回其2012年的票數。
• 經濟動力邱榮光、自由黨田北俊的支持者多屬中間派中間收入或中產人士，蛇齋餅糉效力不大，相信轉投周浩鼎的人不多。不妨假設2012支持這兩張名單的選民有60%轉投方國珊，20%投周浩鼎、20%放棄投票。
• 龐愛蘭較親建制，但也有試圖建立獨立形象。不妨假設其得票數有70%投周浩鼎，30%放棄投票。
• 民建聯、工聯會選舉工程綿密，地區福利工作聞名遐邇，可以假設2012年投工聯會葉偉明、民建聯葛珮帆、陳克勤的選民會全投周浩鼎。
• 新界東居港滿七年的新移民較受建制地區工作影響，當是70%投周浩鼎，20%投楊岳橋、餘下的由黃成智、方國珊平分好了。
• 首投族較傾向不滿政府，保守推斷，周浩鼎在這組選民當中最多得票10%。以最近中大學生會選舉的結果推斷，梁天琦、楊岳橋分別取得首投族當中60%、30%的選票，應該不算不合理。

那麼計算顯示：

(a) 如果梁天琦可以全取當年被視為激進民主派的梁國雄、陳志全、范國威的得票數，再加上溫和民主派（劉慧卿、張超雄、蔡耀昌、湯家驊、龐一鳴）得票數的12%以上，則會勝出。
(b) 如果楊岳橋可以全取溫和民主派（劉慧卿、張超雄、蔡耀昌、湯家驊、龐一鳴）2012年的得票數，加上梁國雄、陳志全、范國威得票的8%以上，則會勝出。
(c) 若果梁楊之票數分佈介乎(a)、(b)之間，或者民建聯能夠取得更多2012年投經濟動力、自由黨的選民支持，周浩鼎就很有可能漁人得利而勝出了。

另外一些個人想法：

• 方國珊當選機會較低，但今次補選積累的氣勢有助她九月入立會。
• 其實周浩鼎、方國珊、梁天琦、楊岳橋四人如果九月重返新東參選，看來都可以當選。

想要Excel試算表自己沙盤推演一下的朋友，請臉書私訊在下。

(新界東補選候選人包括劉志成、黃成智、周浩鼎、梁思豪、方國珊、梁天琦、楊岳橋。)

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On Henry Litton’s speech at the FCC

Last Wednesday The Honourable Justice Henry Litton, former Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association and retired Court of Final Appeal judge, gave a speech at the Foreign Correspondents' Club [video recording]. It was predictably controversial in the local Chinese and English press, and was replied to by politicians and commentators of various stripes.

This is my attempt to add to that debate. I am not a lawyer and have no formal legal training whatsoever. I write from a layman's perspective. I may make errors in my transcriptions, and I apologise in advance shall any arise.

1. Curiously, the local media of both affiliations and languages chose to downplay or even omit Henry Litton's key message: after 2047 the international guarantees will lapse. Hong Kong's Basic Law, legal system, and way of life will be a matter of grace for the Chinese legislature. In his own words,

"What has Hong Kong got to offer? When such discussions about the future of Hong Kong [beyond 2047] once again take place, there will be some who will argue that English should cease to be an official language, and if at that time the common law system is seen to be flabby, slow, costly, pedantic, obscure, the question will be asked how can such a system be put forward as a model for a global financial and business centre... [By then] Hong Kong will then be on its own. There will not be another sovereign power alongside, contending for the continuation of our governing system and lifestyle, as Britain did in 1983."

Mr Litton was right to point out this grave matter. That is, unless there were to be drastic changes to the body politic of China in the next 32 years, Hong Kong will have to show China that preserving its socioeconomic system will bring China more benefit than cost. But while he identified the disease, his diagnosis of where Chinese interest lies was sometimes tangential, and as we would see, as a result his prescriptions may not be the most appropriate.

2. Mr Litton seems to believe the Chinese government would like to see the legal system to be more approachable to the local Chinese population . There is no evidence for that. In contrary, Hong Kong's value lies in being the place where China can deal with the rest of the world; if the legal system could serve this better by remaining operating in English, then that is where Chinese interest lies too. Yet Henry Litton suggested that

"...some 80% of the population governed by the common law do not speak English... the judgments handed down by the court should be brief, direct, written in simple English so that they can, if necessary, be translated into Chinese. Obscurity spells injustice." 

He then went on to note that in a certain recent judicial review (JR) case, the High Court referred to persuasive precedents from jurisdictions as far as Nigeria, Lesotho, and South Africa, and asked how the judgment could possibly be translated into Chinese. This comment is intriguing. Should the African precedents be not persuasive, then the critique should be directed to the line of reasoning, not translatability; should they be persuasive, then they should be referred to. The technical difficulty he noted - translation into Chinese - is hardly material in the face of persuasive precedents that should be rightly cited, no matter wherefrom. It could easily be surmounted by adding footnotes to the Chinese version of the judgment that briefly describe the underlying cases.

3. He certainly thought the current court operation inefficient or even inappropriate. He recalled 1995 case of Hui Kin-Hong (許健康). Hui, a civil servant in the Lands Department at the time, was charged of possession of unexplained property, and hence in breach of s. 10 of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance. Hui then applied for judicial review on the grounds that the relevant section were inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and should be struck down, as the charged officials were presumed to be guilty unless they explain the source of their property to the court's satisfaction. Henry Litton then recalled, as he sat at the Court of Appeal then, he only considered the history and actual conditions of Hong Kong, and did not look for persuasive precedents from all around the world. The judgment, written by Kemal Bokhary, was only eight pages long.

I do not think this is a fair comparison. As Henry Litton himself noted, in 1995, there were 'no trumpets, no fanfare, just the ordinary work of an appellate court'. That world, in which a judge of European extraction could just outline the rationale behind his judgment in a few pages, is long behind us. The Hong Kong society now demands more from the judiciary - in particular in cases with a high level of public interest. It is only reasonable for judges to be more detailed in their writing and consult relevant precedents in other jurisdictions more widely. After all, justice has to be seen to be done.

4. Around two thirds of his speech then used the proliferation of judicial review as an example that Hong Kong's legal system has become flabby and slow. As I understand from his speech, applicants for judicial review must first obtain leave to do so from a judge at the Court of First Instance, and such leave should only be granted if there were an arguable case.

He was critical of the approach the responsible judges took in three recent proposed JR applications - TVB's application with regards to granting new television licences, and Kwok Cheuk-Kin (郭卓堅) and Yvonne Leung's (梁麗幗) applications in connection to the first and second stage public consultation in the political reform process respectively. In all three cases, the responsible judge summoned the lawyers of both the applicant and the putative respondents to a hearing, and to argue whether there were a reasonably arguable case. He considered this unnecessary and inefficient - if there were no arguable case, then it should be summarily dismissed with a single paragraph. In his words, 'zero adds up to zero'.

But should the judge have done what he suggested, what would the judiciary become in the public's eyes? Again, justice has to be seen to be done, especially in judicial review cases where the local society has divergent views on. It remains puzzling to me that Henry Litton, one of the most respected former judges of Hong Kong, seemed to be quite willing to risk public confidence in the judiciary for some efficiency savings in court time. To do so would be an error, and would not add value to the Hong Kong legal system in the eyes of China or anyone.

5. He alleged that Yvonne Leung's application for judicial review was just an act of grandstanding, has no arguable case, and the court's hearings were a waste of time, and such act should be condemned by court. While I concur that Miss Leung's act was mainly grandstanding, I cannot see why a summary dismissal or even a condemnation by the court would boost public confidence in the judiciary. In politically controversial cases such as this one, it is commendable that the court has chosen to err on the side of caution, and chose inefficiency over potential perception of unfairness.

6. He also said, in what sounded to me a light-hearted bad joke that nobody laughed on the spot, that Yvonne Leung might have wanted to put the fact that she had sued the Chief Executive into her CV. What Henry Litton meant was that the object of JR, the second-round consultation on political reform, was undertaken by the three-person Taskforce on Political Development - the Chief Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, and the Secretary for Constitutional and Mainland Affairs, and the CE should not be listed as a putative respondent. But as the judgment set out, Miss Leung did not list the Chief Executive as a putative respondent; she listed him as a putative interested party. Instead of dealing a fatal blow against the former president of HKUSU, the Honourable Justice seems to have hit a straw man instead.

The emphasis that so many media from both sides of the spectrum attached to this remark, and their failure to check the facts, reflects the sorry state of the press in Hong Kong today.

7. Towards the end of his speech The Honourable Justice made a disheartening remark with regards to the 2011 judicial review case on the environmental impact assessment around the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge project. In his own words,

"... The judgments are so obscure that no one can understands them. Yet if there's one thing that symbolises the relationship between Hong Kong and the Mainland, it would be that bridge. Delay on the Hong Kong end must have had impact on the project as a whole. How was this explained to the Mainland authorities concerned?"

The Honourable Justice may well consider the case vexatious, not reasonably arguable, or should simply be summarily dismissed at the first instance. But the quote above is the thin end of the wedge. It is akin to suggesting that apart from considering the relative merits of the arguments that the parties presented, the court should also take into account the reaction of some authorities in a neighbouring jurisdiction. Should this become the prevalent view in Hong Kong's appellate courts, what would become of the public and international confidence that the judiciary currently enjoy?

8. His conclusion is worth repeating too.

"The legal system in many instances is wrapped in obscurity, clothed in mumble-jumble, suffocating under citations, and drowning in irrelevance. The question - the harsh question - must be asked. Is the Hong Kong judiciary sleepwalking towards 2047, wandering in a dream world of its own, a world of authorities, legal texts, precedents, black letter laws, as if those were the entire substance and reality that exist, detached from the people whose only language is Chinese? ... As 2047 closes in, what Hong Kong needs is present to the world as a robust, vigorous legal system, one that is clear-cut, expressed in language easily understood."

I agree and fully support that the Hong Kong judiciary should modernise, use Chinese more, and conduct its proceedings in a way that is more accessible to the general public. On the other hand, the Hong Kong legal system should also remain valuable to the Chinese government, so that its preservation could be justified beyond 2047. But these are two important yet distinct issues. The former is a reform that has been long overdue; come 2047 or not, the system should stop alienating members of the public who are not proficient in English as soon as possible. On the other hand, whether China has an interest in preserving the common law system has everything to do with its commercial and political considerations, and very little to do with whether it were approachable to the local ethnic Chinese population or not. We should not confuse one important question with another.

9. On an unrelated point - the impact of the economic policy adopted by successive Hong Kong governments in the last 30 years was described by the Honourable Justice so eloquently:

"We don't have gas, oil, minerals, [or] coal; we have no industry to speak of; the verdant rice fields of Shatin, Tai Po, and Yuen Long are long gone; our seas are cleared of fish; we import water from the East River and electricity from Daya Bay."

10. A final note. Despite all of Mr Litton's suggestions for moving forward and change, the whole affair sounded more like a far echo from a bygone era. His view that judges should just hand down judgments without fully explaining their line of reasoning even in the most controversial cases is unmistakably colonial. In a mirror image of how local ethnic Chinese often failed to differentiate the divergent agendas of the British Government in London, the colonial service officials in Hong Kong, and local merchants of British descent such as the Swire and Keswick families - lumping them under the 'British' bracket - the Honourable Justice might have inadvertently made the mistake of equating the Chinese government's interest with that of the monolingual Chinese-speaking residents of Hong Kong. This is unlikely to be the case. Even the setting was that of the yesteryear: what could be more nostalgic than a former judge of Eurasian descent delivering a speech in English in, of all places, the Foreign Correspondents' Club?

And this elitist, condescending, 'I know better than thou' attitude of an older day is exactly what Hong Kong has to move forward from.

P.S. I would like to thank Valerie CHAN, Chun Ho LAI, and MUK Lam for the kindly discussions. All errors are mine.

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On Ronny Tong

I met Ronny Tong twice. The first time was in March 2010, in a casual conversation event in LSE. The event was supposed to be about the Competition Bill (which did become law the next year), but the Q&A session was all about electoral reform. His views were surprisingly mild: for instance, he did not think his functional colleagues in the LegCo would vote themselves out of relevance for nothing, and a feasible reform bill must somehow placate the interests they represent. Above all, he repeatedly emphasized the need for compromise.

A year and a half later, I saw him again on my way to the local corner shop. He was standing for the district council election in my constituency, at the time when the Civic Party brand has become heavily tainted over the course of the Vallejos right of abode case. He was clearly fighting a losing battle. Rarely did anyone pick up the leaflets he was distributing. A month or two later, he was soundly defeated by the independent incumbent.

Some alleged he was bought or blackmailed by the pro-Establishment camp or their masters. I have proof neither for nor against, but my personal memory is not in line with that conspiracy theory. Instead, I see a consistently moderate democrat who finds himself ever more diverged from his own party, and honourably, followed his party line one last time in a crucial vote before he left the party and resigned his seat. An honourable gentleman who, alas, may not be the most effective politician in these dusky times.

Time will tell if I were misinformed. But Ronny Tong the man is of minor importance now, in comparison to the seat he left behind. The by-election in NT East, where just over a quarter of the electorate is found, will be the first serious test of political support right after the 18th June vote. For the pan-democrats, losing the seat would open the path to irreversible restrictions on filibustering being put in place, further curtailing the limited influence they now have. 

But the pan-democrats do not have an easy battle to fight: in 2012, they pocketed 57% of the vote, and that might go down a bit after (how the mainstream media portrayed) what happened over the past year. And a split of that vote is imminent. The localists, having risen to such fame, probably could not resist attempting to prove they are now part of the mainstream - even at the cost of handing the seat to the Establishment under an effectively first-past-the-post system. This by-election could be a real turning point, at which I hope history would fail to turn. 

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投票記

今天特意提前出門，早上八點前就抵達投票站。沒想到的是，投票站外已經有大約二十人在排隊。有推著嬰兒車的少婦，有大學生模樣的，也有西裝筆挺，大概是打算上班前先投票的人。天是陰的，人群是安靜的。沒有人在說話。

排隊投票

報上名字和住址，跟選舉主任領了票（兩張，同日有地方議會補選），就往投票間走。不是第一次投票，但我還是會對這一切流程的樸素——樸素得可能有點業餘和兒戲——感到感動。選票是一張普通的A5大小的白紙，黑白印刷，上面有候選人的姓名、住址、以及所屬黨別及其黨徽（也是黑白的：工黨變了黑玫瑰，自民黨是黑色的鳥，保守黨是黑色的樹）。投票間裏沒有原子印，卻有一支不知刨過多少次的鉛筆，供選民在屬意的候選人旁邊劃上X號。我沒有在香港投過票，但選票聽說比A4大，還是彩印的，上面有候選人的照片、簡短政綱，相當精美；票站內還有原子印，供選民投票之用。實在是專業的安排。但是我們已經知道，選票的重量，與印工是否精美無關。

投完票出來，看一看錶，已是八點十五分。排隊的人同樣地安靜，但好像更多了。回到公司，才發現原來不少同事和我一樣，特地提早出門投票。午飯時大家談各區選情，談得興高采烈。但沒有人說自己投了誰，也沒有人問，彷彿那是毋須說出口的共識。我直屬的項目主管不在公司，他兒子的小學被徵用作投票站，是日學校假期，他在家工作比較方便。

市面一切如常，連路燈上呼籲投票的海報也沒有。但是我們知道，從西南盡處的歌和老郡，到極北的昔德蘭群島，全國有成千上萬的人，安靜地前往就近臨時掛上「投票站」牌子的小學、公共游泳池、社區中心、高爾夫球場、或者酒吧，排隊在一張印工粗糙的A5紙上，用鉛筆畫上一個符號，對摺，然後放進好像廢紙回收筒的票箱。安靜地，蘇格蘭的工黨鐵票集體轉向，把全境染成蘇格蘭民族黨的黃色；安靜地，推翻此前六個月的所有民意調查結果，英格蘭的人民似乎選擇了讓保守黨順利組閣；安靜地，自民黨即將失去大多數議席，為五年前的背信付出代價。安靜地，歷史正在被書寫。

P.S. 看來民意調查這種東西還是信不過啊。

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延伸閱讀：

Financial Times. The architecture of democracy, 7 May 2015.
Guardian. Weird and wonderful polling stations - in pictures. 7 May 2015. 

英國大選淺評

禮拜四英國大選，個人看法如下：

1. 除非明天後天選情有戲劇性發展，兩大黨均不能取得國會650席中的半數以上。今年選舉議題不限於社經政策之左右，地域主義抬頭，舊時假設單議席單票制下，左右兩邊的選民會自行棄保，催生兩大黨輪流執政的「傳統智慧」已經失效。

2. 主打退出歐盟，限制東歐移民的英國獨立黨支持度企穩在15%左右，以支持度計，是第三高。但在單議席單票制下，擴張過快，候選人質素參差以至頻頻失言，加上缺乏地區樁腳，將成為其致命傷。預計其議席進帳不多於五席，但其存在足以牽制兩大黨的移民政策，使其偏向收緊。

3. 工黨今日的局面，足證「中間選民理論」的實踐並非萬試萬靈。1980年代戴卓爾趁左翼分裂之機，推行經濟自由化，打擊工會力量，任由中北部以及蘇格蘭的製造業和礦業衰落；1990年代貝理雅帶領工黨向中間靠攏，放棄將生產資料國有化的黨綱第四條，走所謂的「第三條道路」，於1997年大勝。但這建基於舊工業區的選民在別無他選的情況下，只能含淚投工黨，容許其全力向中間選民拉票。但這個基礎已經消失：主推獨立，毋須考慮英格蘭中間選民的蘇格蘭民族黨，有條件比工黨更左，從而得到當地選民支持，而在英格蘭，主打限制東歐移民，保障本地勞工的英國獨立黨，也在向多年含淚投票，但覺得工黨越來越離地的舊工業區選民招手。但如果工黨左轉，迎擊蘇民黨和獨立黨，又會得失近二十年累積的中間選民。這種結構性的問題，並非文立彬與選民「刻石為盟」可以解決的。

4. 最新民調顯示，蘇格蘭民族黨勢將囊括當地59個議席中的51席，成為國會關鍵少數。可見在地域主義抬頭時，單議席單票制會加強地區政黨的影響力。去年獨立公投時倫敦曾許諾蘇格蘭財政自治，但隨著油價下降，北海石油逐年減產，蘇民黨最近已改為鼓吹財政自治後應保障蘇格蘭公共開支不變——即是若當地稅收減少，則應由倫敦增加補貼作為補償。由此可見，獨立已非短期目標（我以為，獨立的含義就是命運自主，自己政府自己交稅養）。長遠而言，一旦對當地人有利的自治條款全數實現，而若作為「終極目標」的獨立又再被選民否決，蘇民黨或會重演較早前加拿大魁人政團的故事，在歷史任務完成之後被選民拋棄。

5. 自民黨2010年以大學學費議題主打選舉，承諾一旦勝選，將於六年內恢復大學免費。黨魁克萊格甚至錄了一段影片，承諾會「反對一切增加大學學費的議案」，供全英學聯週年大會播放，又帶領該黨絕大多數候選人簽名反加學費。後來自民黨加入聯合政府，大選後才五個月，身為副首相的克萊格已經和保守黨一起，支持將大學學費上限由£3,225加到£9,000了。經此一役，自民黨支持度由2010年大選的23%跌到10%左右，自此一蹶不振。在下其實覺得2010年的大學學費改革方案其實不錯（長文有機會後補），但如果這樣背棄選民都不需要在選舉中承擔後果的話，還要民主幹甚。

6. 其實保守黨經濟政策是不錯的，英國經濟增長亦居西歐前列，但實質工資停滯不前，加上復甦多集中於東南一隅，令經濟牌在全國範圍內影響有限。同時，和工黨情況類似，保守黨亦受黨內右翼，以及獨立黨牽制，不能太往中間靠，維持削減移民的目標，甚至要在2017年舉辦歐盟退留公投，實在並非我等外來勞工可以投得下手的啊。

7. 英倫主流政黨不在北愛運作，其18席將由當地政黨瓜分。由於留英派和共和派居住區相當鮮明，不預料有驚喜。威爾斯政治文化仍接近英格蘭，威爾斯黨進帳不會多。

8. 最後還有綠黨。呃，怎麼說好呢，反正沒有可能執政，他們大有在政綱裏只談理想的本錢。

9. 以結果而言，最新的調查似乎是在說保守黨會贏得最多議席，但因為行將佔據關鍵少數地位的蘇民黨比工黨更左，並明言不會支持任何保守黨為首的政府，工黨文立彬入主唐寧街的機會甚高，但未必能長久。尤其是明年蘇格蘭自治議會改選，工黨和蘇民黨皆視對方為主要對手，屆時在全國政府還能否繼續合作？似乎一兩年內提前大選的機會甚大。

10. 利申：我住在工黨鐵票區，選舉氣氛平淡，通常透過傳媒了解選情，難免有偏差。如果閣下有意在英國某些博彩公司的賭盤下注，或者從事任何投資，請勿以此作為參考。

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